THE EARTH IS NOT FLAT, AND
“A QUASI CONTRACT IS NOT A CONTRACT, AT ALL”1 –
TENNESSEE RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT LAW
JULI LODEN
I. INTRODUCTION
It may surprise some to learn that there is a substantive body of law other
than criminal, contracts, torts, property, or constitutional law. 2 This knowledge gap
is attributable to the legal curriculum‟s lack of focus on the law of restitution. 3
Despite being overlooked, claims under the law of restitution and unjust enrichment
continue to flourish as bright and enterprising attorneys find new and novel ways to
apply it or make use of traditional uses others either never learned or simply forgot. 4
1

Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913, 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).

2

See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS vii (1936);
ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, & RACHEL M. JANUTIS, REMEDIES: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 809 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). “Examples of actions based on the idea of
unjust enrichment, for which there is no direct tort or contract counterpart, include actions for
indemnity, subrogation, quasi contract, and rescission.” JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES 330 (2d ed. 2006). Fischer further divides the law of restitution into two categories of
parasitic restitution: “restitution for wrongdoing,” which may arise from torts and “restitution for
breach of contract.” Id. at 331-44. Under this analysis, restitution for unjust enrichment represents a
third category of restitution and covers situations where restitution is the only grounds for recovery.
Id. at 331-55. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
X (Discussion Draft 2000) (The Director of the American Law Institute admits to being ignorant
regarding the law of restitution prior to beginning the restatement project and says “[a]lmost no one
of my generation, not to mention the vast percentage of lawyers who are younger than I, has had a
course in Restitution.”); see generally Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191 (1995)
(“Significant uncertainty shrouds the modern law of restitution.”); Douglas Laycock, Essay: The Scope
and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1989) (suggesting that a general lack of knowledge
of restitution pervades the legal profession).
See FISCHER, supra note 2, at 332; Kull, supra note 2, at 1195 n.14 (chronicling the decline in the
number of teachers who identify themselves as teachers of Restitution since 1964); Laycock, supra
note 2, at 1277.
3

See Beth A. Levine, Comment, Defending the Public Interest: Citizen Suits for Restitution Against Bribed
Officials, 48 TENN. L. REV. 347 (1981); E. Haarvi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on
Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1244-51 (2006) (discussing use of unjust
4
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The law of restitution and unjust enrichment is “based on the goal of avoiding unjust
enrichment.”5 Understanding the doctrine is rather simple because most people find
“that a party receiving a benefit desired by him, under circumstances rendering it
inequitable to retain it without making compensation, must [pay for it]” only natural. 6
Unjust enrichment‟s focus on the “disgorg[ement]” of a benefit received by
the defendant rather than compensation for harm to the plaintiff or compensation
for the plaintiff‟s disappointed expectations makes it a unique claim with a unique
remedy.7 Because there is quite a bit of dispute about the nomenclature in this area
of law, it is important to identify the meaning of the terms as used in this comment. 8
Here, unjust enrichment refers to a broad cause of action that establishes a right to
the remedy of restitution.9 To avoid using the same term to refer to different, closely
related concepts, the body of law is referred to as “restitution and unjust

enrichment as basis for payment of reasonable medical fees where the contract is too indefinite);
Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 718-30
(2006); Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There A Moral Justification for Redressing Historical Injustices, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 127, 128-30 (2008) (discussing redress through restitution and reparations pursued for the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, as well as the Holocaust and the
mistreatment of Native Americans). See also In re Estate of Marks, 187 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006) (upholding a claim that the plaintiff should be compensated by her boyfriend‟s estate for the
reasonable value of financial and business services provided to her boyfriend even though no contract
existed); Freeman Indus. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005) (an indirect purchaser
of goods filed a claim against the manufacturer on the grounds that the manufacturer‟s price-fixing
unjustly enriched the manufacturer at the plaintiff‟s expense.).
5

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330.

Paschall‟s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966); see generally SHOBEN, supra note 2, at
796-97.
6

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 796-97, 808 (Note, however, that in this treatise the terms “unjust
enrichment” and “restitution” are used interchangeably to refer to the basis for liability.); see also
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 334-35 (providing a discussion with examples).
7

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330-32, 334; see also Laycock, supra note 2, at 1277-78 (the goal of his essay
is to “address the definitional dispute in a practical context.”).
8

“Courts may treat unjust enrichment as a separate, substantive cause of action, or as a concept
applicable to other ca[u]ses of action.” FISCHER, supra note 2, at 344. “[T]he doctrines of „unjust
enrichment‟ and „restitution‟ – modern terms – have largely supplanted the designation of „quasicontracts.‟” 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 6 (2001).
9
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enrichment.”10 Finally, the term “restitution” refers to the remedy. 11
Importantly, restitution sometimes means more than just restoring the
plaintiff to its position before it conferred the benefit.12 Sometimes, it means the
defendant must disgorge both the benefit obtained and any additional gains
associated with the unjustified benefit.13 Because the windfall should go to the
innocent party, this disgorgement may leave the plaintiff better off than if she had
never conferred the benefit.14 Ultimately, restitution restores the defendant to its
position before it was unjustly enriched.15
When discussing unjust enrichment at law claims, the term “equitable” is also
a term of art. It refers to “broad considerations of right, justice and morality . . . .” 16
The term restitution is often used as both the area of law and the remedy. See FISCHER, supra note
2, at 330-31, 344; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Discussion Draft 2000) (suggesting using both terms to “emphasiz[e] that the subject matter
encompasses both an independent and coherent body of law, the law of unjust enrichment, and not
simply the remedy of restitution”); Stephen A. Smith, Forum: The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is
Restitution A Right or a Remedy?, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1037 (2003) (referring to this area of law as unjust
enrichment and focusing on determining whether the term “restitution” should refer to the
substantive right or the remedy).
10

11

“Courts may treat restitution as a substantive right or as a remedy.” FISCHER, supra note 2, at 344.

12

See Laycock, supra note 2, at 1279-83.

13

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 796-97.

14

See id.

Absent fraud or other improper conduct, “restitution will be limited to the measure of the
defendant‟s gains.” Id. at 809.
15

FISCHER, supra note 2, §44, at 355 n.10. In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 213-17 (2002), the court offered the following explanation of the difference between restitution
at law and restitution in equity:
16

In cases in which the plaintiff „could not assert title or right to possession of
particular property, but in which nevertheless he might be able to show just
grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had received
from him,‟ the plaintiff had a right to restitution at law through an action derived
from the common law writ of assumpsit. In such cases, the plaintiff's claim was
considered legal because he sought „to obtain a judgment imposing a merely
personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money.‟ Such claims were
viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract (whether the contract was
actual or implied).In contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in
the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property
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Claims for unjust enrichment at law may be understood as hybrids of equity and law
because they do incorporate equitable principles.17 However, such claims are
technically actions at law, not actions in equity.18 An unjust enrichment claim asks
identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to
particular funds or property in the defendant‟s possession. A court of equity could
then order a defendant to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to
give a security interest (in the case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who was, in
the eyes of equity, the true owner. But where “the property [sought to be
recovered] or its proceeds have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the
plaintiff's] claim is only that of a general creditor,” and the plaintiff “cannot enforce
a constructive trust of or an equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant].”
Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose
personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant's possession.
Id. (citations omitted).
FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44, at 353. A court may “[e]nforce[ ] [w]hat [g]ood [r]eason and [g]ood
[c]onscience [r]equire” by invoking equitable principles and maxims whether it is sitting in equity or in
law. HENRY R. GIBSON, GIBSON‟S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 2.25 (William H. Inman ed., Matthew
Bender 8th ed. 2004) (1891).
17

FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44. The merger of the courts of law and equity resulted in “the extension
of equitable defenses, with their moralistic heritage, to actions at law.” Id. § 20.3.1, at 198. The term
“equity” as used in the administration of justice means:
18

Conscience itself might make too refined or too unstable a standard for the
determination of human conduct in the Courts; and reason of itself might give too
wide a range for sharp practices in matters of trade, or other dealings. Indeed,
conscience without reason might degenerate into fanaticism, or gross eccentricity.
On the other hand, reason without conscience might become trickery, or even
downright knavery.
In the administration of justice, conscience must be conformed to reason and thus
become good conscience, and reason must be conformed to conscience and thus
become good reason; and whatever good conscience and good reason unite in
approving is the nearest approach to perfect justice man is able to attain. This
union of good reason and good conscience is what in a general way is meant by the
term Equity in the administration of justice.
GIBSON, supra note 17, § 2.25. That use of the term “equity” must be distinguished from the equity
body of law since “[c]ourts still recognize equity as a separate, freestanding body of law” with a system
of jurisprudence different from that “at law.” FISCHER, supra note 2, §§ 44, 20.3.1, at 198; SHOBEN,
supra note 2, at 5. For example, “[t]he Seventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that there is
a right to trial by jury for causes „at law,‟” but not for causes in equity. SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 5.
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the court to find that reason and justice require the court to make the defendant do
what is right. A court may “[e]nforce[ ] [w]hat [g]ood [r]eason and [g]ood
[c]onscience [r]equire” by invoking equitable principles and maxims whether it is
sitting in equity or in law.19 A court hearing a case at law uses legal fictions like quasi
contracts to effectuate equitable outcomes.20 The quasi contract is a fictitious
contract between the parties where the court uses the defendant‟s social duty to deal
justly with others as a substitute for actual consideration and legally obligates him to
disgorge the benefit received.
Despite the simplicity of the doctrine of unjust enrichment, it is incredibly
easy to get confused by the legal concepts that effectuate the doctrine‟s goal. There
are three primary sources of confusion. First, implied-in-fact contracts and impliedin-law contracts are intertwined with each other because, when a claim is brought for
one, a claim will generally also be brought for the other; however, they are also
mutually exclusive.21 An implied-in-law contract cannot exist where there is an
implied-in-fact contract covering the same subject matter.22 An implied-in-fact
GIBSON, supra note 17, § 2.25. Maxims and principles of equity include, but are not limited to the
following:
19

1.

He Who Comes Into Equity Must Come With Clean Hands.

2.

Equity Imputes an Intention to Fulfill an Obligation.

3.

Equity Will Undue What Fraud Has Done.

4.

Equity Aids the Vigilant, Not Those Who Sleep Upon Their Rights.

5.

No One Can Take Advantage of His Own Wrong.

6.

Where One of Two Persons Must Suffer Loss He Should Suffer Whose Act or
Negligence Occasioned the Loss.

7.

Where There is Equal Equity the Law Must Prevail.

8.

Where There Are Equal Equities the First in Order of Time Shall Prevail.

9.

Equity Enforces What Good Reason and Conscience Require.

Id. §§ 2.01, 2.09, 2.11, 2.15-2.16, 2.18-2.19, 2.21-2.22, 2.25.
20
21

See FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44, at 354-55.
See Cigna Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., 195 S.W.3d at 32; FISCHER, supra, note 2, §44.

Jaffe v. Bolton, 817 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied
Contracts § 24; see Cigna Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., 195 S.W.3d at 32-33 (indicating quantum meruit and
unjust enrichment are synonymous and then ruling against the unjust enrichment claim because an
implied-in-fact contract existed); see also FISCHER, supra note 2, at 354-55 (recognizing that sometimes
22
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contract exists if the facts and circumstances support the inference that there was
mutual assent and an agreement was formed.23 Thus, where the conduct of the
parties justifies the inference that an enforceable agreement exists, although it was
not spoken or written, there is no basis for an unjust enrichment claim. 24 However,
where the conduct falls short of proving that an actual and enforceable contract
exists, and under the circumstances a reasonable recipient should have known that
the conveyor expected payment, then the court may imply a contractual relationship
in order to render justice.25
Second, while the term “restitution” is often used to refer to the body of law
controlling unjust enrichment claims and the remedy for such claims, restitution may
also be available in the case of breach of an actual contract as an alternative to
compensatory damages. 26 The use of the restitution remedy following the breach of
an implied-in-fact contract easily leads one to the mistaken belief that an unjust
enrichment cause of action was the basis for recovery when the recovery was, in fact,
on contract.27 A recovery premised on unjust enrichment may occur after the breach
of a contract.28 However, restitution is available after the breach because, under the
theory of unjust enrichment, the breach extinguishes the contract. 29 So, after the
breach, the obligation does not result from the manifestation of the parties assent
through their conduct or otherwise; rather, it results from the fact that the defendant

quasi contract is used in reference to contracts implied in fact, which is confusing, and distinguishing
between real contracts and quasi contracts).
Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3012, at *1-2 (July 12, 1984). Compare
Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) with V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Inv. &
Fin. Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1980).
23

See JEFFREY FERRIELL
(2004).
24

AND

MICHAEL NAVEN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS §§ 15.05-15.08

25

Id.

26

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 333-34.

See Castelli, 910 S.W.2d at 427 (citing V.L. Nicholson Co., 595 S.W.2d at 482); see also V.L. Nicholson
Co., 494 S.W.2d at 482 (relying on an implied-in-fact contract as its basis for an element of a type of
implied-in-law contract: quantum meruit).
27

28

See FERRIELL, supra note 24, §§ 15.05-15.06.

See Newton v. Cox, 954 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); accord FERRIELL, supra note 24, §
15.05, at 669; SHOBEN , supra note 2, at 810-14.
29
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no longer has a legal justification to retain the benefit.30
Finally, there are two types of restitution based upon unjust enrichment:
restitution at law and restitution in equity. 31 Restitution in equity refers to claims for
equitable remedies such as equitable liens and constructive trusts. Restitution at law
refers to claims for the return of a benefit or the disgorgement of profits. This
comment focuses on the traditional causes of action for unjust enrichment at law:
quantum meruit, quantum valebant, and money had and received, which represent
specific characterizations of the more general unjust enrichment claim often referred
to as a “quasi contract” or “contract implied in law.” 32
These causes of action describe types of benefits conferred by the plaintiff.
Quantum meruit refers to services rendered by the plaintiff and any materials
auxiliary to those services.33 Quantum valebant refers to the defendant becoming
unjustly enriched from the receipt of goods without compensating the plaintiff for
the value of those goods.34 Money had and received refers to a mistaken monetary
payment by the plaintiff which the defendant ought in good conscience to return,
but has not. 35 As a result, the defendant has been unjustly enriched in an amount
equal to the mistaken payment. 36 However, an action for money had and received
also exists if the payment at issue was made by a transfer of property rather than
money. 37
Although very little scholarly time and attention is paid to these claims, they
See Grissim & Assocs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tenn., 114 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002); Paschall‟s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1996); see also City of Rockwood v.
IMCO Recycling Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (Plaintiff argued that the prior contract
and course of performance established an implied in fact contract, but the court found that there was
not an enforceable contract covering the subject matter, as a result unjust enrichment claim was
viable.)
30

31

66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 1 (2001); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.

See Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 153-54; Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Hann, 921 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995).
32

33

See BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (8th ed. 2004).

34

Id.

35

Id. at 31.

36

Id.

37

See Boyd v. Logan, 3 Tenn. 394 (1883).
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are essential tools for any litigator and are quite useful if properly pled. They create
safety valves for a client who has been wronged, but who has no contract or whose
contract is voidable, where the defendant‟s action falls short of a tort, where the tort
recovery would be too small to be worth the plaintiff‟s time and energy, and where
the tort statute of limitations bars the tort suit. 38
For example, while the statute of frauds prevents recovery based upon some
oral contracts, it does not prevent recovery based upon unjust enrichment. 39 So,
even though the plaintiff cannot recover on the actual contract, he may still be able
to recover restitution through a claim based upon unjust enrichment. 40 In some
circumstances, an unjust enrichment claim may result in a greater monetary judgment
for the plaintiff than a tort claim. 41 For example, the defendant, Clepto, steals her
friend Plaintiff‟s new gold ring, and wears the ring only when plaintiff is not around.
A couple of years go by, and gold becomes really valuable, so Clepto sells Plaintiff‟s
ring. Plaintiff finally learns that Clepto stole her ring and sues Clepto. Of course,
See Steelman v. Ford, 911 S.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§
28-3-104 to -106 (2009); McCombs v. Guild, Church & Co., 77 Tenn. 81, 89 (1882); 18 TENN. JUR.
Limitations on Actions §§ 11, 13 (2005); 7 TENN. JUR. Contracts §§ 97-106 (2005 & Supp. 2009). In Vance
v. Schulder, the court explained:
38

An individual induced by fraud to enter into a contract may elect between two
remedies. He may treat the contract as voidable and sue for the equitable remedy
of rescission or he may treat the contract as existing and sue for damages at law
under the theory of „deceit.‟ The latter is grounded in tort. „Thus, a person who
has been injured by the fraud of another or others, by either a party or parties to a
transaction or a third party or third parties committing fraudulent acts involving or
bringing about the negotiation of a transaction, such transaction usually but not
necessarily involving business or commercial dealings, may maintain an action at
law in tort or recover damages for the injury received from the fraud and deceit
perpetrated by such other or others. The foundation of the action is not contract,
but tort.‟
Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tenn. 1977) (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit §332).
But see Scandlyn v. McDill Columbus Corp., 895 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (In this state,
no right exists in law or equity which allows a party to abandon an express contract and seek recovery
in quantum meruit or under an implied contract theory.).
39

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 333; see Steelman, 911 S.W.2d at 723-24.

40

73 AM.JUR.2D, Statute of Frauds § 447.

See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort
Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 352, 370-72 (1984).
41
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Plaintiff could recover under the tort of conversion, where she would likely recover
the market value of the ring at the time of the theft, and Clepto would retain the
profits she made on the sale. However, Plaintiff could also elect to recover based on
a claim for unjust enrichment, which would entitle her to the amount the buyer paid
Clepto for the ring, leaving Clepto with no benefit from her unjustifiable act. Finally,
if Plaintiff knew Clepto stole her ring, but did not file suit because she assumed that
Clepto would eventually return it, the tort statute of limitations may prevent her
from making her tort claim. Plaintiff could still recover, though, by filing an unjust
enrichment claim which would not be time-barred because it would fall under the
contract statute of limitations.
Tennessee courts often say that quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, implied
in law contracts, and quasi contracts are synonymous. 42 The problem with that
statement is that it glosses over the differences between the general unjust
enrichment claim and the more specific quantum meruit claim. If the terms were
synonymous, then there would be no need for separate definitions. In the last
decade, Tennessee courts have not spent considerable time and effort trying to
articulate exactly what constitutes an unjust enrichment claim and what constitutes a
quantum meruit claim. 43 As a result, this area of the law remains difficult to
See e.g., Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1966); Rocky Top Realty v. Young, No. E2009-00338COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2009); In re Sadler, No. M200300414-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11. 2004); Crye Leike, Inc. v.
Ouer, No. W2003-02590-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004).
42

See supra note 42 for a few of the recent appellate cases where the courts fail to distinguish between
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment See generally 21 TENN. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW & PRACTICE,
§1:14:
43

First, unjust enrichment is not a theory of recovery, but is an effect; it refers to the
result of a failure of a party to make restitution when it is equitable to do so.
Second, quantum meruit describes the extent of liability under a quasi-contractual
theory; it is not a cause of action and is not the same as unjust enrichment. Lastly,
one authority correctly distinguishes quantum meruit and unjust enrichment as
follows:
The measure of recovery for services furnished or goods received depends on
whether the claim is for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. The reasonable
value of work and material provided by a contractor is the issue in a quantum
meruit case, whereas in an unjust enrichment case, the inquiry focuses on the
benefit realized and retained by the defendant as a result of the improvement
provided by a contractor. Additionally, the amount recoverable in quantum meruit
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comprehend and rife with contradictory statements that effectively and detrimentally
obscure the rule of law in this area. 44 For example, the current definition for
quantum meruit could easily be interpreted to include implied-in-fact contracts.
Although unjust enrichment causes of action fill coverage gaps in the law, the
rule of law that governs these claims remains mired in a frustrating quagmire. 45
Recently, however, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment have catalyzed the debate about how to best make sense of all the claims
that fall under “the central substantive notion that one must not (unjustifiably) enrich
oneself at the expense of another.” 46 As courts continue to work on improving the
understanding of these claims, a clearer rule of law may emerge from these efforts by
judges who truly understand the nature of unjust enrichment and its more specific
causes of action: quantum meruit, money had and received, and quantum valebant.
Until then, hopefully this comment provides a simple, useful, and up-to-date
explanation of the law of unjust enrichment and restitution in Tennessee.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin and Development of Restitution at Law
The concept of equity existed long before the concept of tort or contract,
which is attributed to the first Dean of Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus
Langdell.47 Actually, it was not until the 16th century that courts imposed liability for
will not include profits, and may be capped at an amount no higher than the
contract price, where there is one for reference.
The Tennessee Supreme Court should clarify these related concepts at its next opportunity.
Courts all over the country misstate and misapply the law of restitution and unjust enrichment. See
Kull, supra note 2, at 1194-96 n.15-16.
44

45

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 344; Laycock, supra note 2, at 1278.

James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 57 (2007). In this article, Rogers also identifies the
substantive notions behind torts and contracts. “Tort. The central substantive notion is that one
must not (unjustifiably) harm another.” Id. “Contract. The central substantive notion is that one
must not (unjustifiably) fail to perform one‟s promise to another.” Id.
46

As far back as Aristotle‟s time, equity and justice were recognized as intertwined. See GEORGE S.
GROSSMAN, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN LAW 25 (Westview Press 2000). Aristotle recognized judicial
justice as corrective justice, which was concerned with “putting right something that has gone wrong,
restoring an equilibrium where the just balance has been disturbed . . . [t]his corrective justice,
47
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breaking a promise to do something, under a writ called assumpsit. 48 The writ of
assumpsit is the common predecessor of both contract and unjust enrichment. 49
This common foundation provides the best explanation for the continued placement
of unjust enrichment causes of action under the contract area of law, and more
specifically, their continued classification as implied contracts. 50
The famous 18th century jurist Lord Mansfield developed the concept of the
moreover, comes in two forms: where it intervenes in situations which are „voluntary,‟ and where it
does so in situation[s] which are „involuntary.‟ . . . The distinction between „voluntary‟ and
„involuntary‟ transactions corresponds superficially with the distinction which we would recognize
between contract, on the one hand, and tortious or criminal wrongs, on the other . . . .” Id. Aristotle
recognized the concept of equity as “a correction of legal justice, because a law speaks in general
terms, and, because of the natural irregularity and variety of the material it tries to regulate, it cannot
provide a perfectly just treatment for every possible case . . . .” Id. at 25-26. The Romans also
recognized the value of equity in a legal system. During the last century of the Roman Republic, a
special defense based on the plea that the plaintiff‟s behavior had been or was now unconscionable
emerged and sufficed to frustrate a plaintiff who might have the strict letter of the law on his side. Id.
at 28-29.
48

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, RESTITUTION Introductory Note (1937).

49

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 796.

50

See 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 2 (2001).

Contracts implied in law are fictions of law adapted to enforce legal duties by actions of contract,
where no proper contract exists, express or implied. A contract will be presumed or implied in law
wherever necessary to account for a relation found to exist between the parties where no contract in
fact exists. An agreement “implied in law” is a fiction of law where a promise is imputed to perform a
legal duty, such as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress.
Id.
In the case of contracts implied by law or quasi-contracts, the promise is purely fictitious and is
implied in order to fit the actual cause of action to the remedy. The liability exists from an implication
of law that arises from the facts and circumstances independent of agreement or presumed intention.
“Quasi contracts” or “constructive contracts” do not arise because of the manifestation of an
intention to create them. The intention of the parties in such case is entirely disregarded, while in
cases of express contracts and contracts implied in fact the intention is of the essence of the
transaction. A quasi-contract has no reference to the intentions or expressions of the parties. The
obligation is imposed despite, and frequently in frustration of, their intention, where justice so
requires. Otherwise stated, contracts implied in law do not arise from the traditional bargaining
process, but rather rest on a legal fiction arising from considerations of justice and the equitable
principles of unjust enrichment.
Id. § 4.
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quasi contract and was also the first to invoke it. 51 An advocate of the natural law
theory, Lord Mansfield proposed that there should be liability under the law based
on moral obligations.52 At that time, law and equity remained two separate courts; at
law, the plea had to fit the writ to succeed.53 To make his theory of moral obligation
amenable to the writ system, Lord Mansfield suggested that justice and equity
allowed the court to imply that the defendant made a promise, and the benefit
bestowed by the plaintiff constituted the consideration for the promise. 54 In that
way, the fiction of the implied-in-law contract was attached to the moral obligation
for the sole purpose of fitting it in the writ of assumpsit. 55
Mansfield‟s implied assumpsit allowed the return of a benefit conferred upon
a person “if fairness and natural justice required the defendant to disgorge the unjust
enrichment received, as when a benefit passed under a failed contract or by mistake
or due to misconduct like coercion.” 56 Despite the mixed reaction of the English
courts to this concept of implied assumpsit, the courts of the American colonies,
where natural law theory was popular, looked upon the quasi contract with favor. 57
The merging of the courts of law and equity further bolstered the legitimacy of the
quasi contract, which was itself invented to allow the courts of law to effectuate an
equitable outcome through a monetary remedy. 58
The writs of assumpsit and trespass existed before either tort or contract was
recognized as an area of law. 59 Before Langdell‟s law-is-a-science theory appeared in
51

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 804.

KEVIN M. TEEVEN, PROMISES ON PRIOR OBLIGATIONS AT COMMON LAW 84-85, n.26 (1998).
Lord Mansfield‟s notion that legal liability should exist for breach of a moral obligation was derived
from his knowledge of Roman civil law and the English chancery courts‟ acceptance of moral
obligation as a basis for equitable relief. Id.
52

53

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 796.

54

TEEVEN, supra note 52, at 84-85.

55

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 796.

56

TEEVEN, supra note 52, at 84-85.

57

Id. at 84-85, 91-94, 106-09.

58

See id. at 7-8.

Although, the tort area of law arose after the assumpsit cause of action, the consensus seems to be
that both tort and assumpsit are offshoots of the original trespass cause of action. See, e.g., GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 44 (1977).
59
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the 1870‟s, “no one thought of developing a theory of contract.” 60 In fact, “no one
saw any reason why all [the many different] types of contracts should be subjected to
a unitary set of rules.” 61 Further, although “[e]very legal system tries to redress harm
done by one person to another,” the concept of creating an area of law like torts did
not emerge until the late 1800s. 62 The very word tort was a label invented so that a
single word could “cover all sorts of liability imposed for non-contractual loss,
damage, or personal injury suffered by a plaintiff as the result of a defendant‟s
wrongful acts.” 63
The Langdellian scholars who constructed the areas of law and organized the
causes of action favored rigid black-letter rules, wanted to pare down the number of
legal doctrines, and left the implied-in-law contract fiction undisturbed.64 However,
it soon became apparent that unjust enrichment had been poorly categorized, and it
Id. at 45. By the time Langdell proposed the theory that law is a science, the contracts claim had
become much more popular than the traditional assumpsit claim because it complemented the new
free market ideology of the Industrial Revolution. Id. at 43-45; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 244 (1973). The goal of Langdell‟s law-as-a-science approach was to
develop “a unitary set of rules . . . to cover all possible situations” by applying doctrine to cases to test
whether or not the cases were correctly decided. GILMORE, supra note 59, at 46-47. Langdell believed
that one should only study correctly decided cases, and those that did not conform to the doctrinal
ideals deemed correct by the Langdellian scholars should be discarded entirely. Id.
60

61

GILMORE, supra note 59, at 45.

62

FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 409.

63 GILMORE,

supra note 59, at 46.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 22-23; GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 25-29; CHARLES REMBAR, THE
LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 280 (1980). At that time, their
decision to leave the duty to return a benefit which you have no right to keep under the contracts area
of law made sense because the radical suggestion that writ pleading should be abolished in favor of
just pleading the facts was only just being made. The Field Code, the first procedural code, was first
published during Langdell‟s lifetime. Dudley Field first suggested that the courts of law and equity
should be combined, and that the common law writs should be replaced by fact pleading. Id. at 23639. That suggestion was unprecedented at that time, and no one could predict it would prevail. See
GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 120-21, 132-33.65 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Ch. 7
Introductory Note (1937) (The Restatement‟s reporters, Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, recognized
that the causes of action used to obtain restitution usually operated independent of tort or contract.).
The American Law Institute was formed in 1923 to compile of the common law, which seemed to
follow Langdell‟s law-as-a-science premise. See also FISCHER, supra note 2, at 331; GROSSMAN, supra
note 47, at 184 (The reporters for the Restatement of Restitution are attributed with first suggesting
“the treatment of Restitution as a distinct body of substantive law.”).
64
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made more sense to combine the claims used to effectuate the doctrine of unjust
enrichment under a separate and distinct area of law on par with tort and contract.
To fix problems that resulted from the division of restitution and unjust enrichment
claims across other areas of law, the American Law Institute published the Restatement
of Restitution in 1937.65
Perhaps bad timing is to blame for the First Restatement‟s failure to really
establish restitution and unjust enrichment as an area of the law on par with tort or
contract. By 1937, law as a science had long since been displaced by legal realism,
which eschewed rigid doctrines along with the black-letter law in favor of studying all
cases with a focus on “operative facts.” 66 There was so little interest in the
Restatement (Second) of Restitution that the project was terminated after the first two
drafts.67 In 2000, the American Law Institute released its first tentative draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which reasserts its stance that
restitution and unjust enrichment should be recognized as an area of law unto itself.68
This Restatement continues to generate much more scholarly attention and interest
than its predecessor, and there is little doubt a final version will be completed and
published.69

B. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Law
Despite unjust enrichment„s continued classification under the contract area
of law, restitution and unjust enrichment are a “separate basis of civil liability, wholly
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Ch. 7 Introductory Note (1937) (The Restatement‟s reporters,
Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, recognized that the causes of action used to obtain restitution
usually operated independent of tort or contract.). The American Law Institute was formed in 1923
to compile of the common law, which seemed to follow Langdell‟s law-as-a-science premise. See also
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 331; GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 184 (The reporters for the Restatement of
Restitution are attributed with first suggesting “the treatment of Restitution as a distinct body of
substantive law.”).
65

66

GILMORE, supra note 59, at 48-49.

67

American Legal Institute, http://www.ali.org/ali_old/Restit.htm.

68

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2000).

See Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 933 (2008) (Doug Rendleman, an advisor to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT project, discusses the scholarly debate going on within the American Law
Institute and critics from scholars outside the project.).
69
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independent of tort or contract.”70 To establish an unjust enrichment cause of
action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant has been enriched at the
plaintiff‟s expense, and (2) the defendant‟s retention of the benefit is unjustified (i.e.,
the defendant has no legal justification for retaining the benefit). 71 If the plaintiff‟s
claim succeeds, then the court grants restitution, which requires the defendant to
return the benefit, pay the plaintiff for the value of the benefit, or disgorge both the
value of the benefit and any profits made by the defendant that are attributable to
that benefit.72
People commonly refer to the terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment”
synonymously when referring to the plaintiff‟s claim. 73 However, the terms may
properly be understood to refer to the cause of action and the remedy. 74 Using
“unjust enrichment” to refer to the cause of action and “restitution” to refer to the
remedy distinguishes between the law‟s two separate, complementary functions:
establishing an entitlement and establishing the remedy. 75
The first inquiry is whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the
plaintiff.76 To establish the entitlement, that is all the plaintiff must prove. 77 The
70

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330.

Id.; see Friedman Indus. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005); B & L Corp. v.
Thomas & Thorngren, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 189, 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). But see FISCHER supra note 2,
at 312 (a prima facie case of unjust enrichment requires the following elements:
71

1.
2.
3.

72

A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff with the expectation
of payment;
Awareness, appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
Acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances
as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
payment to the plaintiff.)

See Thompson, supra note 41, at 366-73; see generally FISCHER, supra note 2, at 322-25.

See Paschall‟s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1996). But see Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Hann,
921 S.W.2d 194, 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (specifying that an action for money had and received is
not the same as an action for unjust enrichment).
73

74

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330-31; SHOBEN , supra note 2, at 4.

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 4 (identifying need to distinguish between substantive restitution,
which concerns entitlement to remedy, and remedial restitution, which concerns the measurement of
the remedy.)
75

76

See Freeman Indus., 172 S.W.3d at 525.
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plaintiff does not have to prove any wrongdoing by the defendant or that the
plaintiff was harmed in order to recover under his or her substantive right to
restitution based on the defendant‟s unjust enrichment. 78
Enrichment “is an economic benefit.”79 This concept of economic benefit
includes enrichment by property, money, increase in the value of property, or
avoidance of a cost such as not paying for goods consumed or intangible services
received.80 However, the fact that the defendant received the benefit does not mean
that she has been enriched.81 For example, the defendant may have compensated
someone other than the plaintiff for the benefit.82 If the defendant paid a reasonable
amount for the benefit, then she exchanged value for value, and therefore has not
been enriched.83 In addition, usually the defendant must be the person the plaintiff
intended to charge.84 If the plaintiff intended to charge another person who relayed
the benefit as a gift to the defendant, then the defendant has not been unjustly
enriched.85
Even after the plaintiff proves that he or she provided a benefit to the
defendant, the plaintiff will not be able to establish a right to restitution unless the
defendant‟s retention of the benefit is unjust.86 To determine whether or not the
defendant‟s retention of the benefit is unjust, the nature of the conferral must be
evaluated.87 For example, it would be unjust to require restitution from the
77

Jaffe v. Bolton, 817 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330.

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330 (“The essence of restitution is the recovery of the benefit realized by
the defendant not compensation for the harm or injury sustained by the plaintiff.”).
78

79

Freeman Indus., 172 S.W.3d at 525.

80

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 804-09.

Paschall‟s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154-55 (Tenn. 1996); accord Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist
Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1998).
81

82

Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 154-55.

83

Id.

84

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330. But see Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 154-55.

85

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330.

E.g., Paschall’s, Inc, 407 S.W.2d at 155; Jaffe v. Bolton, 817 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tenn. 1991); see SHOBEN ,
supra note 2, at 244.
86

87

Id.
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defendant if the benefit was gratuitously bestowed or conveyed without offering the
defendant the opportunity to reject it.88 In unjust enrichment terminology, the term
“volunteer” describes people who convey benefits without expecting
compensation. 89 The trier of fact must determine whether or not the conveyor
expected compensation through objective inferences from the circumstances
surrounding the conveyance and the parties‟ conduct. 90
This objective standpoint from which intent is measured results in
presumptions that family members and rescuers are volunteers. 91 Of course,
presumptions are rebuttable. For example, when the work done to rescue a person
is the type of work the rescuer does in their profession, this rebuts the presumption
that the services rendered in the rescue were gratuitous. 92 As a result, a lawyer who
performed CPR acted voluntarily and did not unjustly enrich anyone, but the court
may find that an off-duty doctor who performed CPR had an expectation of
compensation because he is paid to perform those types of services as part of his
profession.93
No one wants someone bestowing a “benefit” on them without their consent
then charging for it. Even if it is something the recipient wants, she may not want it
at the time. Perhaps she wants to wait until she saves more money to cover the
expense. Even worse, perhaps she does not want the benefit at all and finds no
value in owning it. The law of unjust enrichment cannot be used to force others to
pay for things they did not want. In fact, the law uses a very funny label to refer to
people who impose unwanted benefits on others, “officious intermeddlers.” 94
Fairness requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to reject or return the

See 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 15 (2001); see Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell,
1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3012 (July 12, 1984).
88

89

In re Estate of Cleveland v. Gordon, 837 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

See Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 155; V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Inv. & Fin., Ltd., 595 S.W.2d
474, 481-84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Weatherly v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 65 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1933).
90

91

See Estate of Cleveland, 837 S.W.2d at 71.

92

Id.

93

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 245.

94

Id. at 246; 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 14 (2001).
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benefit, if possible.95 However, if the defendant neither approves of the benefit nor
takes advantage of an opportunity to reject it, then she acquiesces to it, and
acquiescence is legally effective acceptance.96One exception to this occurs in
emergency situations.97 There, the requirement that the benefit not be imposed on
the defendant does not apply if the defendant is unconscious, because the law
presumes that if a person could accept life-saving help, he would.98
So, the general rule is that for uncompensated retention to be unjust, the
plaintiff must have expected to be compensated for the benefit when the defendant
conveyed it, and the defendant must have knowingly received or knowingly kept the
benefit. If the defendant was enriched by a benefit conferred by the plaintiff with
the expectation of payment, and the defendant knowingly received that benefit or
kept it when they could have easily returned it, the plaintiff has a right to restitution.
However, if there has been a change of position or circumstances making restitution
inequitable, then the court may deny the plaintiff recovery. 99
The second inquiry the court must make after the plaintiff establishes a claim
for unjust enrichment is to determine the appropriate measure of recovery. 100 The
restitution remedy measures the defendant‟s enrichment from the defendant‟s
perspective, not the plaintiff‟s perspective. 101 The plaintiff‟s remedy of restitution
differs from other remedies because the harm to the plaintiff, costs incurred by the
plaintiff, or the amount the plaintiff expected to receive is irrelevant to the amount
that the defendant owes.102 In that way, the restitution remedy operates opposite of
tort compensatory damages or contract expectation damages. 103 Because restitution
focuses on the effect of the conveyance on the defendant rather than the effect of
the conveyance on the plaintiff, sometimes the plaintiff‟s remedy under an unjust
95

See 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 15.

96

See Scandlyn v. McDill Columbus Corp., 895 S.W.2d 342, 345. (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

97

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 245.

98

See id.

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 880-94; see Ass‟n Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 793 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
99

100

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 322.

101

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 303.

102

Id.

103

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 247.
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enrichment claim is greater than it would be under a tort or contract claim, and
sometimes it is less. 104
In addition, that plaintiff‟s restitution equals the defendant‟s enrichment,
which might be the market value of the benefit or the market value of the avoided
expenditure.105 Alternately, it could be the defendant‟s net economic gain from
either an objective, market-based standard or a subjective standard based on the
defendant„s situation.106 The court will choose a valuation method that reflects the
culpability of the parties.107 If there is some fault in the plaintiff‟s conduct, then the
court chooses a lower valuation.108 For example, if the parties reached an agreement
as to the value of the plaintiff‟s services and the plaintiff breached the contract, the
restitution award would likely be limited to the value the plaintiff gave to the contract
when he entered into it, rather than its market value if the market value is greater. If
the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff, the court chooses the higher
valuation.109 So, if the defendant defrauds the plaintiff and invests the proceeds,
earning a significant return, the court is likely to find that the defendant must
disgorge those profits. That effectively leaves the plaintiff better off, but restores the
defendant to his pre-conveyance position. All things equal, the court chooses a
valuation that balances the concerns of both parties but restores the plaintiff as
closely as possible, without imposing undue hardship on the defendant, to its preconveyance position.110
Failing to distinguish between restitution as an equitable form of relief and
restitution as a legal form of relief also causes problems. In Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, the Court specifically held that “for restitution to lie in equity,
the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but
104

See THOMPSON , supra note 41, at 370-73.

105

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 249-51. 106 Id. at 249.

106

Id. at 249.

“In deciding which measure to use to value the benefit, the particular circumstances of the case
control and the trial court is generally given substantial discretion. There is a tendency to calibrate the
harshness of the remedy with the seriousness of the culpability.” FISCHER, supra note 2, at 324, 32632.
107

108

Id. at 324-25.

109

See THOMPSON , supra note 41, at 370-73.

110

See FISCHER, supra note 2, at 328.
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to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant‟s
possession.”111 Since claims of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, quantum
valebant, and money had and received are all claims for restitution at law, this
explanation aids in understanding that equity might call for a return of property, even
where the law will not require monetary compensation.
The claim for restitution in Knudson was based on a statute that only allowed
for equitable remedies.112 There, the Court found that the plaintiffs‟ claim failed
because they were seeking a monetary remedy, which was legal restitution and was
therefore precluded by the statute.113 Had the plaintiffs made a claim for a lien
against property or repossession of property in the defendant‟s possession, then their
claim would have been for equitable restitution, which would have been valid under
that statute.114 Essentially, the Court refused to award equitable restitution to the
plaintiffs because their claim asked for legal restitution. 115
Currently, if a plaintiff seeks restitution at law, then the unjust enrichment
claim is based on a quasi contract. The quasi contract is not the only concept that
falls under the law of restitution and unjust enrichment; other fictitious causes of
action exist by which courts use their equity jurisdiction to prevent unjust
enrichment.116 Furthermore, the court will not form the legal fiction that is the quasi
contract if its creation would effectively extinguish or alter the parties‟ rights
established by a real contract.117 If there is an actual and valid contract, there is no
need for a legal fiction based on social ideals; the parties‟ private agreement
establishes their standard of conduct towards each other and they are held to their
agreement.
111

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).

Id.; see also Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (The
statute governing misappropriation of trade secrets preempted plaintiff‟s claim for restitution at law
based on Astec‟s “„unjustly receiv[ing] proprietary and confidential information belonging to
[Plaintiff]‟ and benefiting therefrom without compensating Plaintiff.”).
112

113

Id. at 212-13.

114

Id. at 213.

115

Id. at 214.

See SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 4, 796, 804, 843, 860 (discussing constructive trusts and equitable
liens).
116

117

Jaffe v. Bolton, 817 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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The court only creates a quasi contract if an actual contract covering the
subject matter at issue does not exist, is invalid, or ceased to exist because the
contract was materially breached. 118 This tends to be confusing, because in the
present state of the law, the quasi contract legal fiction is no longer necessary. There
are no strict writs, and a quasi contract is not really a contract at all. In addition,
people like to shorten the awkward “implied-in-law contract” and “implied-in-fact
contract” labels to just “implied contract,” thus encouraging failure to distinguish
between those two legal concepts.119
A contract implied-in-fact is no less a contract than an express contract,
because both are based on “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty.” 120 Moreover, because a promise is a voluntary commitment to do
something in the future, the only difference between the express contract and the
contract implied-in-fact is that the parties to an express contract manifest their assent
through words, written or oral, whereas the parties to an implied in fact contract
manifest assent through conduct (i.e., an undertaking).121
The decision to categorize the restitution and unjust enrichment at law claims
within the contracts area of law resulted in an unexpected advantage for tort
claimants who lost their right to make the claim to the tort statute of limitations.
Certain tort claims can be re-characterized as claims based on unjust enrichment to
provide some recovery for that plaintiff because, as a quasi contract, they are subject
to the longer contract statute of limitations. Characterization of a claim as unjust
enrichment provides a handy way around the tort statute of limitations‟ bar on
recovery. In addition, the fictitious quasi contract is usually seen in situations where
(1) parties plan to enter a contract but the transaction fails to produce a valid
contract; (2) a valid contract has been rescinded following a breach and recovering
the defendant‟s enrichment is more attractive than recovering contract damages; (3)
plaintiff conferred a benefit because of a promise by the defendant, but without any
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 319. For a Tennessee case expressly following that general rule, see
Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998).
118

Nashville v. Cigna Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 28, 32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Compare
Jaffe, 817 S.W.2d at 24 with V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Inv. & Fin, Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474, 481
(Tenn. 1980).
119

120

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).

121

See 42 C.J.S. Implied and Constructive Contracts § 7 (2007); FERRIELL, supra note 24, §§ 1.01-.02.
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consideration; or (4) where there were no words or conduct by the parties which
would amount to contractual interaction with each other. 122
Quasi contracts may be referred to by a specific cause of action created to
refer to the type of unjust enrichment that occurred.123 The chart below summarizes
the types of unjust enrichment and their corresponding causes of action.
Action

Cause of Action

Benefits Conferred by
Mistake

Money Had and Received or Unjust
Enrichment

Benefits Derived from
the Commission of a Tort

Money Had and Received or Unjust
Enrichment

Benefit of Rendition of
Services

Quantum Meruit or Unjust
Enrichment

Benefit of Receipt of
Goods

Quantum Valebant or Unjust
Enrichment

An action for money had and received is often brought by an insurance
company that either accidentally overpaid a claimant or mistakenly paid a claimant
who does not have a right to the payment due to some provision in the policy. 124
Money had and received was extended to torts by the creation of the fiction that the
defendant recipient acted as the agent of the plaintiff conveyor. 125 Courts may allow
money had and received claims as substitutes for the torts of fraud, conversion, and
misappropriation, and occasionally for trespass claims. 126
In researching the use of unjust enrichment as a vehicle for recovery where
there is also a tort, one is likely to run into language indicating that the plaintiff
See City of Rockwood v. IMCO Recycling, 415 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Tenn. 2006); Paschall‟s, Inc.
v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1966); In re Estate of Marks, 187 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
122

123

See 42 C.J.S. Implied and Constructive Contracts §§ 8-9, 12-17, 26-28 (2007).

See Ass‟n Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 793 F. Supp. 161 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Hann,
921 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
124

125

SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 834.

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 335-37; see also SHOBEN, supra note 2, at 828-43 (providing an in-depth
discussion with examples and explanations).
126
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waived the tort and sued in assumpsit.127 This is “antiquated” language which should
not be taken literally.128 As one would expect, the plaintiff can make both the tort
claim and the unjust enrichment claim in her pleading, but if she establishes both
causes of action, then at some point she must elect either the tort remedy or the
restitution remedy.129
Although less common than quantum meruit, “quantum valebant . . . is still
used today as an equitable remedy to provide restitution for another‟s unjust
enrichment.”130 Specifically, it provides restitution for “[t]he reasonable value of
goods and materials.”131 However, it is difficult to find examples of this cause of
action, which can only be taken to mean that other causes of action are preferred in
these situations.132 Perhaps this is because services and goods are often linked, and
in those instances the quantum meruit claim is made. Alternatively, it may be that
implied-in-fact contracts based on course of dealings more often than not cover
these types of situations. Finally, because most people are unfamiliar with the term
“quantum valebant,” which has steadily slipped out of usage, these claims are
probably brought under the general claim of unjust enrichment.133 In fact, the sparse
reference to it in the law virtually ensures that a plea of quantum valebant will, at
least temporarily, confound the other party. However, it might also confound the
judge. At any rate, given its unfamiliar nature and historical non-usage, this
127

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 337.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 1276.

131

Id.

Traditionally, the quantum meruit claim allowed a plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of
services provided; the quantum valebant claim was primarily for goods, but also included the
“concomitant services” attached to the provision of the goods or supplies. Barrett Ref. Corp v.
United States, 242 F.3d 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2001); accord Urban Date Sys., Inc. v. United States, 699
F.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Significantly, all four of the instances in which the Supreme Court
considered claims for recovery under quantum valebant involved the delivery of goods by the plaintiff
because of a reasonable expectation of payment. See, e.g., Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W.M. Laird
Co., 212 U.S. 445 (1909); Emerson v. Slater, 63 U.S. 28 (1859); Sheehy v. Mandeville, 10 U.S. 253
(1810); Clark v. Young & Co., 5 U.S. 181 (1803). Moreover, American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris
Secundum, and Tennessee Jurisprudence all omit any mention of quantum valebant.
132

133

See City of Rockwood v. IMCO Recycling, 415 F.Supp.2d 853 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).
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effectively ends the discussion of quantum valebant.
Quantum meruit, on the other hand, remains a popular cause of action. Law
students are more often exposed to quantum meruit than any other action based
upon an implied-in-law contract. Most contracts professors will at least mention it
since it arises quite often in construction contracts, while most of the other quasi
contracts may, fairly, be considered too un-contract-like to merit mention. A typical
quantum meruit claim involves the rendition of services and the provision of
materials related to those services. Every litigator should be aware that if the statute
of frauds makes a contract void, quantum meruit may provide recovery. 134 In which
case, the plaintiff might bring a claim based upon the defendant not paying her what
her services were worth or not paying her at all. Although calling it an unjust
enrichment action is correct, referring to it as a quantum meruit action is more
specifically correct.

C. Tennessee Case Summaries
If the restitution and unjust enrichment area of law seems muddled, that is
because its concepts are divided and strewn across other fields of law. Tennessee
has never adopted the Restatement of Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts.135
In order to learn about the unjust enrichment at law subsection of the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment, one must know to research under the following
possible categorizations: “implied contracts,” “contracts,” or “restitution.”136 While
there is some consistency in the categorization, there is no category that provides a
centralized source of information about the restitution area of law. Furthermore,
most of the legal encyclopedia indexes do not have entries for the terms “quantum
meruit,” “quasi contract,” or “unjust enrichment.”137
In short, a person unfamiliar with these claims and their legal status as
contracts would find it very difficult to find information on the unjust enrichment
claim because the parties may have never entered into any contracts. Moreover, it is
134

FISCHER, supra note 2, at 330.

135

See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (1936).

See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts (2004); 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts (2001); 42 C.J.S.
Implied and Constructive Contracts § 7 (2007); Implied Contracts, 2002 TENN. DIGEST 2D; 7 TENN. JUR.
Contracts (2005); 22 TENN. JUR. Restitution and Implied Contracts (2007).
136

137

See 42 C.J.S. Implied and Constructive Contracts (2007).
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common to be unfamiliar with unjust enrichment at law because there has been a
general lack of awareness regarding the law of restitution in the United States for
quite some time.138 The following case illustrations demonstrate how Tennessee
courts apply the law of restitution.

1. Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts
Tennessee law recognizes “two distinct types of implied contracts: contracts
implied in fact and contracts implied in law.” 139 Differentiating between the
concepts of contract implied-in-law and contract implied in fact is not difficult. In
practice, however, whether or not the trier of fact will find that the conduct of the
parties amounts to a manifestation of mutual assent or shared intent is often
unpredictable. A contract implied-in-fact occurs when “according to the ordinary
course of dealing and common understanding of men” the parties “show a mutual
intention to contract.” 140 Therefore, a contract implied in fact still requires evidence
of a mutual intention; a contract implied in law does not. 141
Weatherly v. Am. Agric. Chemical Co. shows that the court will not create an
implied contract that contradicts an express contract. 142 There, the plaintiff argued
that an implied agreement “to mine or pay for all of the phosphate rock” of a
specified quality on the leased property existed within the express contract governing
the defendant‟s lease rights in the plaintiffs‟ land.143 The plaintiff and defendant had
entered into a lease for a period of 20 years.144 The defendant needed the plaintiff‟s
land to access water supplies and wanted to use it to transport mined minerals from
the defendant‟s adjoining properties.145
In entering into the lease, the defendant also secured the right to mine
See Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L.
REV. 487, 488-89 (2007).
138

139

Overstreet v. TRW Com. Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Tenn. 2008).

140

Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3012, at *1-2 (July 12, 1984).

141

See id.

142

See Weatherly v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 65 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

143

Id. at 595.

144

Id. at 594.

145

Id. at 595.
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phosphate from the land leased from the plaintiff. 146 In return, the defendant
promised to pay the plaintiff at least $2,500 a month so that when the defendant was
not actively mining the land, the plaintiff would continue to profit from the lease. 147
The rate of pay when the defendant was actively mining the land was based on the
amount of phosphate mined. 148 When the defendant began mining the plaintiff‟s
land, it turned out that the quality of the phosphate from the plaintiff‟s property was
poor.149 As a result, the defendant ceased mining the phosphate and resumed paying
the plaintiff the minimum monthly rate established in the contract. 150
In its analysis, the court said:
Contracts implied in fact arise under circumstances which, according
to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of
men, show a mutual intention to contract. Such an agreement may
result as a legal inference from the facts and circumstances of the
case.151
The court also explained that:
Evidence of the situation of the parties and their surroundings, of the
motives which induced the agreement, and the object and purpose
designated to be effected by it, may be considered in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties, if it does not tend to contradict
the language of the written instrument. 152
The court then considered case precedent, industry customs, and the written
lease agreement. 153 Finally, the court found that the express term providing for a
minimum payment from the defendant when the property was not being mined
contradicted the existence of an implied-in-law agreement that the defendant would
146

Id.

147

Id. at 595, 599.

148

Id. at 595.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 598. 152 Id. at 597.

152

Id. at 597.

153

Id. at 597-601.
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continue mining until all the phosphate had been removed. 154
V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Investment and Financial Ltd. provides a good
example of an implied-in-fact contract. 155 There, the Johnson City Housing
Authority hired Transcon Investment and Financial Ltd., Inc. (“Developer”) to
develop a housing project.156 Developer set up another corporation, Johnson City
Leased Housing Corporation (“Owner”), “to finance, construct and own the
property [,] [with a charter] characteriz[ing] it as an agency and instrumentality of the
Johnson City Housing Authority.” 157 Developer also selected and hired the
architectural firm and the general contractor, V.L. Nicholson (“Contractor”) for the
project.158
Contractor‟s initial written contract was between Owner and Contractor
only, but Contractor‟s agreement was subject to additional conditions which were
agreed to by Developer.159 The contract contemplated change orders, and
subsequently the architect and Contractor agreed that the original plans needed
revision to bring them up to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development‟s standards. 160 Under the contract, change orders were to be approved
by both Contractor and the architect, or by Owner‟s written consent to the
architect.161 After the work commenced, the architect told Contractor to submit his
change orders directly to Owner. Eight of those change orders were received but
never approved or rejected.162 The change orders resulted in increased costs which
Developer consistently marked as “subject to review” on the Contractor‟s progress
Id. at 600-01. Similarly, in Jaffe, the court refused to create a quasi contract to compensate a lessee
for the large sum it spent on improvements to the plaintiff‟s commercial building. Jaffe v. Bolton,
817 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The court found that the plaintiff voluntarily made the
improvements with full knowledge that by the terms of his lease, the landlord had the right to retain
the benefit of all improvements. Id.
154

155

V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Inv. & Fin., Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1980).

156

Id. at 477.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 478.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 479.
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payment statements. 163 After the contract was complete, Developer refused to
approve payment for the additional work done under those change orders,
prompting the Contractor to file suit. 164
First, the court denied recovery under the express contract.165 It then
considered whether an implied-in-fact contract existed between Contractor, Owner,
and Developer. 166 The Tennessee Supreme Court explained:
Generally, an implied contract is one which is inferred from the
conduct of the parties; it is not necessarily expressed in words. A
promise will not arise by implication, however, when the
circumstances and facts from which the promise would be drawn are
contrary or completely inconsistent with the contract to be implied.
Nor may a contract be implied in fact in the face of a declaration to
the contrary by the party to be charged. If a contract may be implied,
then a commitment to pay reasonable compensation is also implied.
This promise to pay is implied where a person works for another,
with the latter‟s knowledge, and the work is useful and normally
would be compensated and where the person for whom the work is
being done does not object or accepts the services rendered. Thus a
promise to pay will only be implied when the work was performed
under circumstances in which a person could reasonably expect to
compensated by the party benefited. The conduct or words of the
person who receives the benefit of this work must be such that one
could fairly infer a promise to pay. 167
The court then determined that Developer‟s “conduct [was] consistent with
an implied promise to pay . . . Nicholson.” 168 The court found that Developer‟s
actions manifested approval of the change orders. 169 Those actions were that
163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id. at 482.

166

Id.

167

Id. (citations omitted).

168

Id. at 482-83.

169

Id.
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Developer telegraphed the approval and acceptance of Contractor‟s conditions, its
vice-president was at the meeting where the parties decided change orders were
necessary, and Developer had the detailed written change orders and never
disapproved them or tried to stop the work associated with them.170 In addition,
Developer‟s actions cloaked the architect with apparent authority, and the architect
had orally approved the change orders.171 All of the above conduct convinced the
court that the parties did understand that V.L. Nicholson Co. was doing the work for
compensation. 172 As a result, the court awarded the plaintiff recovery against the
defendants under an implied-in-fact contract. 173

2. Implied-in-Law Contracts, a.k.a. Quasi Contracts
Tennessee courts also use the law to create obligations when “a party
receiv[es] a benefit desired by him, under the circumstances rendering it inequitable
to retain it without making compensation . . . .” 174 Contracts implied by law “are
imposed or created by law without the assent of the party bound, on the ground that
they are dictated by reason and justice.” 175 In Tennessee:
any conduct from which a reasonable person in the offeree‟s position
would be justified in inferring a promise in return for the requested
act, amounts to an offer, and that such a request might be implied
when the facts and circumstances are such that the person receiving
the benefit of such work or services know, or reasonably should have
known, that the person doing the work expected to be
compensated. 176
Contracts implied in law are also referred to as quasi contracts, and under
Tennessee law, a claimant seeking recovery under the theory of quasi contract must
prove the following elements:
170

Id. at 483.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id. at 485.

174

B & L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 189, 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

175

Paschall‟s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966).

176

In re Estate of Holding, 457 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tenn. 1969).
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(1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) Appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and
(3) Acceptance of such benefit under such circumstances that it
would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment
of the value thereof. 177
a. Recovery based on quantum meruit
In Paschall’s Inc. v. Dozier, Mary Best hired the plaintiff to install another
bathroom in her parents‟ home where she was also living.178 Her parents assented to
the installation of the bathroom, and knew that the contractor was performing the
work.179 Mary Best went bankrupt and refused to pay the contractor for his work. 180
He sued the parents for the value of his work, and they defended on the grounds
that they had not entered into a contract with him, and therefore could not be held
liable.181
The court acknowledged the general rule that if there was recovery under an
actual contract then the retention of the benefit by an incidental third-party recipient
would not be unjust.182 However, the court rejected the parents‟ argument that the
plaintiff could not recover from them the value of his work and materials because
177

Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3012, at*2 (July 12, 1984).

178

Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 151.

179

Id.

180

Id. at 152.

181

Id. at 154.

Id.; see also Weakley County Hosp. v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 171 Tenn. 662, 666
(1937) (finding an employer liable to the hospital for an employee‟s hospital bill because employer was
legally obligated to pay for work-related injuries).
182

At common law, when a party secures services to be rendered, whether himself or
to another, there is an implied contract to pay for such services. For reasons of
humanity an exception is made generally in favor of someone calling a doctor for
another. Otherwise a neighbor or stranger might hesitate to call for a physician to
attend a stricken man unable to make such a call himself. This exception, however,
does not apply to someone under a legal obligation to supply medical services to
another.
Id.
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the parties had no privity of contract. 183 The court invoked “the principle that a
party receiving a benefit desired by him, under circumstances rendering it inequitable
to retain it without making compensation, must do so.” 184 It also introduced the
following statement into Tennessee case law:
Actions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment, quasi contract,
contracts implied in law, and quantum meruit are essentially the
same.
Courts frequently employ the various terminology
interchangeably to describe that class of implied obligations where,
on the basis of justice and equity, the law will impose a contractual
relationship between parties, regardless of their assent thereto. 185
The court referred to defendant‟s claim brought on the theory of unjust
enrichment for the value of materials and services furnished as “an action on
quantum meruit. 186 Remanding the case, the court provided the following
instruction:
[The] case must be decided according to the essential elements of
quasi contract, to-wit: A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and
acceptance of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be
inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of the value
thereof.187
The court also instructed that if the parents had given consideration to any
one else at all for the work done by the contractor, then they would not have been
unjustly enriched and therefore could not be held liable under quasi contract. 188
Paschall’s, Inc. demonstrates that a claim for quantum meruit is simply a
version of the unjust enrichment cause of action – a version that applies when a
plaintiff performs valuable services for the defendant and justice requires the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the reasonable value of those services even
183

Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 154-55.

184

Id. at 154.

185

Id.

186

Id. at 155.

187

Id.

188

Id.
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if there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. 189 Note
that, under quantum meruit, unlike the general unjust enrichment claim, the
claimant‟s recovery will be:
[L]imited to the actual value of goods or services, not their contract
price. Courts will not award quantum meruit recoveries without
some proof of the reasonable value of the goods or services, but the
required proof may be an estimation of the value of the goods and
services.190
However, “Tennessee law is clear that an award in quantum meruit is not to be
determined by the value of the services to the one who performs the services, but
instead, should be based on the value of the benefit conferred.” 191
In Castelli, the plaintiff provided extensive interior decorating services for the
plaintiffs, wealthy clients who wanted help completely renovating an old home they
purchased. 192 Being friends, the parties discussed orally what the plaintiff‟s job
would be and the defendant‟s rate of pay and billing method. 193 The plaintiffs were
husband and wife; the husband was a doctor, and the wife was not employed. 194
The wife‟s frivolous spending soon exceeded the initial budget, but since she
was personally selecting the items, the interior decorator did not advise her that she
had blown the budget, though he did warn the husband that her spending was
excessive. 195 In the end, the defendants refused to pay their final bill to the interior
decorator.196 In an effort to settle the matter, he offered an alternative fee

189

Id. at 154.

Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. v. SCR Elec., Inc., No. E2006-0263-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 104, at *19 (Feb. 27, 2007) (quoting Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420, 427-28 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1995)); Castelli, 910 S.W.2d at 427-28.
190

Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104, at *19 (quoting Johnson v. Hunter,
No. M2000-03099-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 795, at *18-19 (Oct. 25, 2001)).
191

192

Castelli, 910 S.W.2d at 423.

193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 424.

196

Id. at 425.
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arrangement to the one they initially agreed upon, which they rejected.197 He then
filed suit, claiming the defendants breached an oral contract or alternatively, that the
defendant‟s owed him quantum meruit for the value of the services and materials he
provided.198
The court found the terms of the oral agreement too indefinite to enforce as
an actual contract since the testimony of the parties indicated that “they did not have
a meeting of the minds concerning the essential terms of their agreement.”199
However, reason and justice required the plaintiffs to pay the defendant for the
reasonable value of his services because they accepted those services and both parties
understood he expected to be compensated. 200 As a result, the court used the legal
fiction of the quasi contract as his basis for recovery. 201
In Swafford v. Harris, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a specific list of
elements for quantum meruit from Castelli.202 With no compelling evidence of actual
contract, the court turned to the plaintiff‟s claim based on quantum meruit. 203
Relying on seven previously decided cases, the court determined that for recovery
based on quantum meruit, the following circumstances must exist:
(1) There must be no existing, enforceable contract between the
parties covering the same subject matter;
(2) The party seeking recovery must prove that it provided valuable
goods and services;
(3) The party to be charged must have received the goods and
services;
(4) The circumstances must indicate that the parties involved in the
transaction should have reasonably understood that the person
providing the goods or services expected to be compensated; and
197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 427.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 431.

202

Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tenn. 1998).
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Id.
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(5) The circumstances must also demonstrate that it would be unjust
for the party benefitting from the goods or services to retain them
without paying for them. 204
Under element one, quantum meruit claims do not apply to express
contracts.205 Element two requires the plaintiff to prove he conferred a benefit on
the defendant.206 Element three nicely merges the antiquated quantum valebant
cause of action into quantum meruit because it covers the defendant‟s enrichment by
receipt of either goods or services.207 Element four indicates that quantum meruit
claims apply to implied contracts.208 Finally, element five represents the fact that the
defendant„s enrichment must be unjust.209 All elements must exist, so a defendant
need only show the court that one of the elements is not present to defeat the
quantum meruit claim. 210
In Castelli, the facts supported the existence of the first four elements, but
“[the plaintiff] could still be denied recovery if he acted unethically, improperly, or in
bad faith with regard to the transaction at issue.” 211 Based on testimony from other
interior designers, the court decided the plaintiff‟s business practices were usual to
the interior design industry and therefore not improper, unethical, or in bad faith. 212
Although the plaintiff prevailed, his recovery was limited to the actual value of the
goods or services, rather than the amount he charged based on his billing methods. 213
The court explained:
Liability under quantum meruit is based on a legally implied promise
to pay a reasonable amount for goods or services received. Thus,
204

Castelli, 910 S.W.2d at 427 (citations omitted).

205

See id.

206

See id.

207

See id.

208

See id.

209

See id.
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See id.
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Id. at 429.

212

Id. at 428.

213

Id. at 427.

2010]

TENNESSEE RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT LAW

201

quantum meruit recoveries are limited to the actual value of the
goods or services, not their contract price. Courts will not award
quantum meruit recoveries without some proof of the reasonable
value of the goods or services, but the required proof may be an
estimation of the value of the goods and services. 214
In Castelli, the court found that the actual value was somewhere between the
defendant‟s actual material and labor costs and the amount of his bill. 215
Conversely, in Swafford, the court based its rejection of Dr. Swafford‟s
quantum meruit claim on the fifth element.216 There, Dr. Swafford sued Harris for
payments based on contingency contracts that made payment for the doctor‟s
medical services and expert testimony contingent on the outcome of Harris‟ personal
injury suit.217 Harris prevailed in his personal injury suit, but he did not pay Swafford
as agreed in the contracts.218 Swafford based his claims for recovery on breach of
contract or, alternatively, quantum meruit. 219 The court first found the contracts
void as against public policy based upon professional codes of conduct.220 Then, the
court held that there could be no recovery under quantum meruit because quantum
meruit was not available “where the underlying contract [was found] void as against
public policy.”221
The Tennessee Supreme Court has addressed quantum meruit claims four
times since Swafford.222 Only in Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn. has it formerly
214

Id. at 428 (citations omitted).

215

Id. at 430.

216

Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Tenn. 1998).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 323.
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Id. at 324.

See Cohn v. Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility, 151 S.W.3d 473, 487 (Tenn. 2004) (A bankruptcy lawyer
was ordered to disgorge fees valid because, based on his own testimony, he did not expect to be paid
the full amount charged, and the amounts charged were unjustifiable); Kyle v. Williams, 98 S.W.3d
661, 665 (Tenn. 2003) (The court concluded that an unlicensed contractor may not recover under
either the contract he entered into or quantum meruit. Allowing recovery under quantum meruit
would undermine the public policy and purpose behind the statute requiring licensing.); Doe v. HCA
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reiterated the Castelli elements.223 In Doe, after the court found that the hospital‟s
contract with the patient for payment for services was invalid or unenforceable, it
considered whether or not to allow recovery under quantum meruit. 224 Applying the
Castelli elements for quantum meruit, the court found:
All five circumstances listed in Swafford apply to the pending case.
First, for the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, there is no
existing, enforceable contract between the Jane Doe and HCA
Donelson Hospital. Second, the record clearly shows that the
hospital provided valuable goods or services to Jane Doe. Third, it is
undisputed that Jane Doe received the goods or services provided by
the hospital. Fourth, the circumstances indicate that the parties
reasonably understood that the hospital providing the goods or
services expected to be compensated. Fifth, the circumstances
demonstrate that it would be unjust for Jane Doe to retain the goods
or services without payment to HCA Donelson Hospital.
Accordingly, we conclude that the hospital is entitled to be paid the
reasonable value of the medical goods and services provided to Jane
Doe.225
In a case involving the family service presumption of voluntary conferral, In
re Estate of Marks, the plaintiff filed suit against her dead fiancé‟s estate for “lost
wages, the reasonable value of the services she rendered to the decedent, and the
income she expected to earn as a trustee of a trust established by the decedent.” 226
Health Servs. of Tenn., 46 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tenn. 2001) (A contract requiring a patient to pay a
percentage of hospital fees not covered by insurance was too indefinite as to the amount of fees.
Thus, the hospital could not recover on that contract; however, it could recover on a quantum meruit
basis for the reasonable value of goods and services.); State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
18 S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000) (The court denied “intervenors‟ claim to attorney‟s fees on equitable
grounds, such as quantum meruit, implied contract, and other theories[, because if it allowed them] . .
. to claim fees under the theories being asserted, then any lawyer who has been involved in litigation
against a tobacco company could do the same by merely claiming that their efforts have benefitted the
State. Obviously, such a situation cannot be sanctioned.”).
223

See Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 46 S.W.3d 191, 197-98 (Tenn. 2001).
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Id. at 197.
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Id. at 198 (emphasis in original).
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In re Estate of Moss, 187 S.W.3d 21, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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Following the deaths of their spouses, the testator and the plaintiff started dating,
and a year later they got engaged.227 The testator asked the plaintiff to help him with
his finances because he was not in good health.228 Eventually, the plaintiff had
complete access to his finances and retired from her job at the bank to spend more
time managing the testator‟s business and finances. 229 After the testator learned he
had prostate cancer, he had an attorney draft a prenuptial agreement, created a trust
which named the plaintiff as co-trustee, and drafted a new will including her as a
beneficiary.230 At that point, the plaintiff lived with and took care of the testator;
however, he passed away before executing any of the documents he drafted. 231
The court appointed the testator‟s son as executor of his estate. 232 When the
son no longer needed the plaintiff‟s help sorting through his father‟s financial affairs,
he terminated her trusteeship.233 She responded by filing a lawsuit for lost
compensation and benefits from her employment at the bank. 234 She claimed that
she would have worked there for four more years had she not relied upon the
testator‟s assurance that he would take care of her, and that she only retired because
he asked her to assist him with his business and personal matters. 235
The estate argued that her beliefs did not matter when there was no evidence
of the purported agreement.236 The court agreed that the plaintiff “ha[d] no contract
claim against [the testator‟s] estate that would entitle her to receive lost
compensation and benefits . . . .” 237 The estate then attempted to persuade the court
to dismiss the plaintiff‟s quantum meruit claim. 238 Characterizing the plaintiff as a
227
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Id. at 27.

236

Id.

237

Id. at 28.

238

Id.

204

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE J OURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

family member, the estate argued “she failed to overcome the presumption that her
services to [the testator] were gratuitous and that she failed to prove that under the
circumstances, [the testator] should have understood that she expected
compensation for her services.” 239
Under the family service rule, persons living together may be considered
family.
“The types of services covered by the family service rule include the
personal, domestic, and household services that family members customarily render
to each other without expectation of payment.” 241 The court recognized, however,
that many of the services performed by the plaintiff “were more business than
personal,” and that the plaintiff expected to be rewarded for those services after she
retired from the bank.242 The court decided that even though the plaintiff was
“family” for the purposes of the family service rule, a jury could still find that the
estate had a duty to compensate her for the business-related services she provided to
the testator.243
240

b. Recovery based on Money Had and Received
Steelman v. Ford Motor Credit Co. provides a good example of a payment made
in reliance on an invalid contract and failure of consideration with a refusal to return
a payment. 244 Steelman purchased a failing Ford dealership with a suspended line of
credit.245 He paid Ford $90,000 for 50% ownership of the dealership, and repaid the
amounts outstanding to Ford on vehicles sold by the dealership. 246 He also
established the threshold operating funds required by Ford. 247 Steelman was under
the mistaken understanding that if he took those steps, then Ford would reinstate the

239
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Id. at 30.
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Id. at 31.
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Steelman v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 911 S.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
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dealership‟s floor plan financing agreement. 248 He based this expectation on his
communications with a representative from Ford, who later denied ever saying that
Ford would reinstate the financing agreement.249 Steelman was unaware that a crossagreement between the seller and Ford conditioned the reinstatement of the
financing agreement at the dealership purchased by Steelman on the correction of
problems at the seller‟s other dealerships.250
Steelman never sought enforcement of the alleged oral contract, which would
have been voidable by the Statute of Frauds. 251 Instead, he asked simply that the
court return the money he had paid to Ford under the mistaken belief that it was
consideration for the reinstatement of the floor plan financing agreement. 252 This
characterization of his claim was “of utmost significance,” because “money paid
under the contract for the benefit of the repudiating party may be recovered” when
the following circumstances exist:
(1) [T]he payment made be a part or all of the purchase price;
(2) The payment inured to the benefit of the defendant;
(3) There was a failure of consideration;
(4) Plaintiff did not receive the value of the payments from use and
occupation or other benefits; and
(5) Defendant refused to perform. 253
Similarly, the defendant in Hann was required to return the benefits she
received from Shelter, which exceeded those agreed upon in a subsequent oral
settlement agreement.254 Mrs. Hann, the defendant, and her children were in a car
accident, and Shelter was their insurance carrier. 255 The coverage paying for their
248

Id.

249

Id.

250

Id.

251

Id. at 723.

252

Id.

253

Id. at 723-24.

254
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injury was Mrs. Hann‟s uninsured motorist coverage. 256 Initially, Shelter forwarded a
check for $5,000 with a letter requesting that Mrs. Hann sign a document releasing
Shelter from further liability.257 She cashed the check, but filed suit against Shelter
rather than signing the release. 258 The parties eventually settled.259
After paying Hann the amount agreed upon in the settlement agreement,
Shelter realized it had previously paid her $5,000 and promptly filed suit to recoup
that money.260 Shelter‟s position was that it had agreed to pay the amount in the
settlement agreement without knowledge of the previous $5,000 payment, and that
allowing the defendant to keep it would be unjust because she had been paid more
than her policy limits.261 Unlike the defendant in Jenkins, Hann directly benefited
from the overpayment, and she was aware or should have been aware that she had
been paid more than her policy limits.262 As a result, the court required Hann to
repay the $5,000 she received from Shelter prior to the oral settlement agreement. 263
c. Defenses
In Association Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, Jenkins was the president of
Murfreesboro Truck Sales (“MTS”), where he employed his grandson.264 Jenkins
purchased group insurance coverage for his employees through Association Life
Insurance Company (“Insurer”). 265 The grandson stopped working when he was
diagnosed with cancer.266 After his treatment ended, he resumed working at MTS,
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See Ass‟n Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 793 F. Supp. 161 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Shelter Ins. Cos., 921 S.W.2d
at 202.
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performing light cleanup.267 Jenkins then decided to go out of business, which
involved ceasing operations, but keeping his corporate entity alive while selling off
his inventory.268 After operations ceased, the grandson filed a disability claim with
Insurer.269 A call to the business‟s location by Insurer revealed that MTS was out of
business.270 As a result, per the conditions of the policy, Insurer canceled the
coverage retroactive to the date that business ceased. 271
Insurer then sued Jenkins for the disability payments paid to his grandson. 272
Insurer made its claim under the theory of unjust enrichment. 273 The court
characterized the claim as an action for money had and received, and noted that “in
Tennessee, as elsewhere, insurance companies may sue to recover benefit payments
made due to mistake or fraud.” 274
The court found that whether the mistake was one of fact or one of law
would determine who bears the burden of proving that the retention or transfer of
the benefits would be inequitable.275 Where mistaken payments are made due to a
mistake of fact, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the return of the
benefits would be inequitable.276 Conversely, where a mistaken payments result from
a mistake of law, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that it would not be
inequitable for the defendant to return the benefits erroneously conferred. 277
The court determined that the mistaken payments on the void policy were a
mistake of fact, rather than a mistake of law. 278 As a result, the defendants bore the
267
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burden of proving that it would be unfair for the court to force them to pay back
Insurer.279 The court considered the relative positions of the parties: Insurer only
made the payments because it had no knowledge that the business had ceased to
exist; Jenkins made premium payments and personally received no payments from
Insurer; and the recipient of the benefits was an innocent third party who put those
benefits towards the use intended – payment for medical bills.280 The court
concluded that, in this case, requiring the defendants to return the benefits paid
under a mistake of fact would cause the defendants great injury and injustice because
the defendants relied on payments for medical treatments and the benefits were paid
to the physicians directly.281 Under those circumstances, the court held the
defendant could “retain the advantage in good conscience.” 282
In B & L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren, Inc., the court held that a “[q]uasicontractual theory of recovery involves the willing conferring of a benefit by one
party to the other and is contraindicated when the benefit alleged is involuntarily
conferred.”283 Note that the choice of words here is a bit confusing considering the
general rule that volunteers cannot recover benefits voluntarily conferred. That rule
was essentially irrelevant to the facts of this case, which involved a plaintiff who
suffered losses when two employees entered into a joint venture to establish a
competing business, solicited the plaintiffs‟ employees, and took a major client with
them when they left.284 Here, the court‟s reference to the involuntary conferral by
the plaintiff as negating the claim for unjust enrichment simply recognizes that the
plaintiff must intend to charge the defendants, and to intend to charge, she must
voluntarily enter into the transaction.285 When the facts show that the plaintiff
intended to charge and the benefit conferred to the plaintiff was valuable to the
defendant, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the “absence of
usefulness.”286
279
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Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell provides a good example of a defense which
negated an essential element of the plaintiff‟s substantive claim. 287 There, the
plaintiff drilling company drilled a well on property owned by the defendant, Bank of
Tennessee, without the bank‟s knowledge, previous transactions with the bank, or
any intent by the bank to contract for the installation of a well. 288 The bank
benefited from the work done by Welch Bros. Drilling Company because the value
of the property appreciated as a result of the well.289 Despite the benefit to the
defendant, the court found that the plaintiff could not recover the value of the
benefit since there was neither a contract implied in fact nor a contract implied by
law.290 In that decision the court explained:
The proof shows that the bank clearly has benefited from plaintiff's
labor and materials. Unfortunately, the questions of appreciation and
acceptance are less clear in this case because the property is
unoccupied. Therefore, it is impossible to appreciate and accept the
benefit of the well in the usual way. However, we believe that the
appreciation and acceptance requirements are designed to guarantee
that the property owner be given a choice to accept or reject the
benefit bestowed by a mistaken improver. In this case the Bank has
had no such choice. Therefore we hold that there has been no
acceptance by the defendant and there can be no quasi contract. 291
The court further explained that, while it sympathized with the plaintiff
drilling company, “as between two innocent litigants, the loss must lie with the
mistaken party.” 292
In Weatherly, the mining case discussed in the previous section, the court also
considered whether absent the express term, the circumstances justified the creation
of an implied in law contract. 293 Contrasting implied-in-fact contracts and implied287

Welch Bros. Drilling Co. v. Russell, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3012, at *1-3 (July 12, 1984).
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in-law contracts, the court said “[c]ontracts implied in law, or more properly quasi or
constructive contracts, are a class of obligations which are imposed or created by law
without the assent of the party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason
and justice . . . .” 294
Generally, if a lease to mine is silent, the law imposes a duty on the lessees of
mineral rights to continue to develop and work mines with due diligence.295 The
court reasoned, however, that in this case such a contract would bind the defendant
to mine all phosphate, “whether or not it [was] mineable, merchantable, or
profitable.”296 The court determined that even without that express provision, it
would not have created an implied-in-law contract with such a harsh, one-sided
effect, especially since the facts showed that the defendant suffered significant losses
from the venture. 297 Thus, even if there had been no express provision covering the
disputed term, a defense based on undue hardship could have succeeded. 298
Importantly, a plaintiff seeking recovery under a claim for unjust enrichment
must exhaust all other remedies unless they prove that “the pursuit of the remedies
would be futile.”299 Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway illustrates the use of
the affirmative defense of election of remedies.300 In Whitehaven, a building
contractor entered into an agreement with a landowner to build a church. 301
Subsequently, the landowner defaulted on his construction loan payments to a
lender.302 The lender foreclosed on the building, and the contractor sued the lender
for the value of the improvements under the theory of unjust enrichment. 303 The
court dismissed the contractor‟s claim of unjust enrichment of the lender because the
294
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Freeman Indus. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 515, 525-26 (Tenn. 2005); see Whitehaven
Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998).
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contractor, whose contract was with the debtor, had retained funds from the loan as
compensation and had not exhausted remedies against the debtor for any
deficiencies.304 Similarly, a statute may preempt an unjust enrichment claim. 305
In Metro Gov’t of Nashville v. Cigna Healthcare of Tenn., Inc., Cigna failed to
purchase a bond securing its obligation to Metro Nashville employees. 306 In seeking
bids for a contract to provide healthcare coverage to its employees, Nashville
required the successful bidder to purchase a performance bond as a condition
subsequent to acceptance of their bid. 307 Cigna was the successful bidder. 308 During
the contract term, Cigna performed all conditions except purchasing the bond. 309 In
addition, the parties failed to put their agreement in writing; therefore there was no
written contract.310 When Nashville discovered that Cigna had not purchased the
bond and the parties had no formal written agreement, it asked Cigna to purchase a
bond for the remainder of the contract, but Cigna declined to do so.311 Nashville
sued Cigna under theories of unjust enrichment, or, alternatively, breach of an
implied contract.312 Cigna admitted it agreed to purchase the bond and then failed to
do so but contended that Nashville suffered no harm as a result. 313 Cigna
demonstrated that its bid did not include the cost of a performance bond, but that
the amount of its bid would have been the same whether or not a performance bond
was required.314
The court decided that Nashville‟s claim for unjust enrichment failed because
the facts showed an implied-in-fact contract existed.315 However, it also found that
304
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Nashville‟s claim would fail even without an implied-in-fact contract because
Nashville did not confer a benefit on Cigna due to the fact that it did not pay any
additional amount to cover the cost of a bond which was not purchased. 316 The
court recognized that Cigna would have incurred an additional expense, but found
Cigna‟s avoidance of that expense immaterial to the decision of whether or not Cigna
was unjustly enriched.317
Subsequently, in Freeman Indus. v. Eastman Chem. Co., the court held that “a
benefit is any form of advantage that has measurable value including the advantage
of being saved from an expense or loss.” 318 Moreover, “to recover for unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff need not establish that the defendant received a direct benefit
from the plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may recover for unjust enrichment against any
defendant who receives any benefit from the plaintiff if the defendant‟s retention of
the benefit would be unjust.” 319 This contradicts Cigna, where the court determined
that Cigna‟s savings as a result of not incurring the expense of the bond did not
amount to enrichment. 320 If Cigna was heard now, a good argument could be made
that Cigna unjustly shifted the risk of its non-performance to Nashville and that the
expense it saved resulted in enrichment. 321 After all, the plaintiff in an unjust
enrichment claim does not have to be harmed by the defendant‟s conduct for the
claim to succeed. 322

III. DISCUSSION
According to the rules cited above, it appears that Tennessee adheres to the
traditional understanding of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and money had and
received.323 A specific definition for quantum meruit helps differentiate it from the
316
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Like Tennessee law, the original quasi-contract action included the descriptive claims of quantum
meruit and quantum valebant based upon “reoccurring situations” known as “common counts.”
FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44.1, at 353-55.
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general unjust enrichment claim. Unfortunately, the choice of language and
precedent for element four creates an additional opportunity for confusion. 324 This
is confusing because both implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts are based
upon inferences by the trier of fact that are derived from the parties‟ conduct. 325
First, element four appears to refer to an implied-in-law contract, because it
only requires that the parties‟ conduct prove that they should have understood
payment would be due for the services provided, not that they actually did
understand payment would be due. However, element four‟s underlying precedent is
V.L Nicholson Co., a case where recovery was granted based on an implied-in-fact
contract, not an implied-in-law contract.326 In fact, V.L. Nicholson Co. never discusses
implied-in-law contracts. As a result, it is unclear to those unfamiliar with quasi
contracts what types of claims the definition of quantum meruit should be
understood to cover and how those claims differ from the general unjust enrichment
claim.327
The case from which element four was extracted did involve a contract
implied in fact, so subsequent cases must be analyzed to ascertain which
interpretation is correct. In Doe, the charges for medical services were never
specifically relayed to Jane Doe, so she never had an opportunity to agree or disagree
to the hospitals charges.328 Based on those facts, her conduct could not be construed
as forming an actual contract. 329 As a result, her liability to the hospital for the
reasonable value of its goods and services was imposed by law on the basis of
equity.330 It follows then that element four is meant to refer to implied-in-law
contracts, but not implied-in-fact contracts, despite the precedent upon which it is
based.331
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Yet, beyond their shared origin, it is difficult to comprehend why a claim for
unjust enrichment is grouped under the contract area of law. After all, where there is
a valid claim under the theory of unjust enrichment, there is no valid contract. In
this way, they are the antithesis of each other. Unjust enrichment claims are based
upon “duties imposed by law,” which “are themselves equitable in nature, resting on
the moral obligation to do what is right.”332 A contract only arises after the court
hears the case and decides the defendant should repay the plaintiff. 333 In unjust
enrichment cases, the duty gives rise to an “agreement,” which the defendant
probably does not agree with at all. 334 Conversely, in a contract, the parties‟
agreement results in their duties to each other. 335
Conceptually, unjust enrichment is akin to both tort and contract, though not
really belonging in either. Where there is no actual contract, fact pleading alerts
neither the claimant nor the defendant to the possibility that a viable claim may exist
under the contract area of law or under the theory of implied-in-law contracts. In
short, the continued characterization of unjust enrichment as an implied contract
creates problems for both attorneys and judges, including how to effectively plead
the facts, how to effectively answer these pleas, and perhaps most importantly, what
instructions to give a jury. 336
Tennessee‟s definition of quantum meruit provides just one example of the
confusion perpetuated by the continued use of the quasi contract fiction.337
332

FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44, at 355-56.

“Real contracts may be distinguished from quasi contracts by recognizing that, in cases of the
former, the agreement defines the parties‟ duties, while in cases of the latter, the duties define the
parties‟ „agreement.‟” FISCHER, supra note 2, § 44, 355.
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Juries in Claims at Law, 43 ARK. LAW. 10 (2008); see also 21B AM. JUR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE
FORMS Restitution and Implied Contracts §§ 4, 74-76, 79, 81 (2001) (providing formats for pleadings,
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Tennessee adopted a definition of quantum meruit which provides an element that
accurately describes an implied-in-law contract, but would with the change of one
word describe an implied-in-fact contract:
(1) Current, implied-in-law version of element four: “the
circumstances must indicate that the parties involved in the
transaction should have reasonably understood that the person providing
the goods or services expected to be compensated.” 338
(2) Implied-in-fact contract version of element four: the
circumstances must indicate that the parties involved in the
transaction did understand that the person providing the goods or
services expected to be compensated.339
Still, both types of implied contracts depend upon an inference based on
conduct or course of conduct. Though wholly different from a conceptual
standpoint, the same fact patterns create the basis for both claims: where there is no
written or express agreement but the facts show that the parties either did know or
should have known that the defendant had to pay the plaintiff. In these cases, the
trier of fact determines whether or not the facts and circumstances indicate there was
mutual assent. If so, then a true contract existed. If not, then the trier of fact moves
to the next step – deciding whether or not to create a quasi contract. Therefore, the
key to differentiating between implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts is the
difference between “did know or did assent” and “reasonably should have known,” or put
another way, the difference between did and should.
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court recently supplied much needed
338

Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

339

See generally 21 TENN. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE, §1:14.
Courts frequently employ the various terminology interchangeably. Each is based
upon an implied obligation where, on the basis of justice and equity, we impose a
contractual relationship between parties, regardless of their assent. Id. at 154.
Unfortunately, the phrase “implied contract” has been erroneously used to connote
both true contracts (those which are implied “in fact”) and quasi contracts (those
which are implied “in law”). See Ridgelake Apartments v. Harpeth Valley Util. Dist.
of Davidson & Williamson Counties, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210, No. M200302485-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 831594, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 8, 2005). This
error has led to much confusion.

Cigna Healthcare, 195 S.W.3d 28, 32.
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explanations for both the unjust enrichment and the quantum meruit claims, these
actions are unlikely to clear up this quagmire. In the past, the Supreme Court‟s
definition was expanded, contracted, and inter-mixed as the courts saw fit.
Additional explanations by the courts usually turn out to be a string of the old quotes
put together like puzzle pieces which add little clarity or guidance. It is not a lack of
explanation that is the problem; rather, the problem is that this particular legal fiction
ceased to have any basis in reality when the pleading system changed from writbased to fact-based.
Still, the law is full of fictions, most of which we accept without question.
The quasi contract, however, is a particularly difficult fiction, lacks actual utility, and
tends to confuse, which raises the question of whether or not we should continue to
use it or relegate it to history. Conceptually, the simplest and most logical solution is
for the courts to relegate the quasi contract to history, to remove “quasi contract”
and “implied-in-law contract” from their vocabulary, and instead to refer to the
doctrine of unjust enrichment as the basis for restitution.340 After all, changing
vocabulary requires no change of precedent; it requires a change of perspective.
After a while, the legal encyclopedias and digests will follow suit. Unfortunately,
while that solution is conceptually attractive, it is practically impossible. For the
most part, the reported cases decided on the basis of quasi contract were correctly
decided, and so they are good precedent. As long as they are good precedent,
attorneys will rely on them and invoke that contractual fiction.

IV. CONCLUSION
As this comment demonstrates, Tennessee follows the traditional common
law approach to claims for restitution and unjust enrichment at law. This approach
can be confusing. Moreover, at least in the case of unjust enrichment at law, “there
is little call for insistence that the quasi contract format be used rather than the more
general form of unjust enrichment.” 341 Still, removing the quasi-contract fiction
See Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487,
488 (2007) (advocating a systematic approach to restitution theory and practice where “numerous
lower-level rules (the individual rules of law used to decide cases) are connected to each other through
a legal concept [here, the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment] that is more general and abstract than the
rules themselves . . . [as] serv[ing] the values of legal determinacy, the rule of law and judicial
restraint.”
340
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might also cause confusion because Tennessee‟s common law is replete with
references to it.342
However, the split of the legal concepts that together effectuate the doctrine
of unjust enrichment across different areas of the law, particularly those areas to
which the doctrine is linked via legal fictions, obscures the doctrine. The doctrine‟s
purpose is further hindered by the scotoma in the legal curriculum, which causes a
knowledge vacuum and general unfamiliarity with the doctrine.343 This general
unfamiliarity, combined with the lack of a centralized source of information, reduces
attorneys‟ ability to effectively invoke the doctrine of unjust enrichment.344
For these reasons, bringing together the causes of action which effectuate the
doctrine of unjust enrichment and recognizing restitution and unjust enrichment as
an area of law is not only conceptually attractive, it is also practical. 345 However, the
more conservative of the two Restatements, the Restatement of Restitution: Quasi
Contracts and Constructive Trusts, also relies on references to the quasi contract. 346
Moreover, controversy continues to surround positions taken by the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment and it has not even been finalized.347 Finally,
reconfiguring the Tennessee common law that governs Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment into its own area of law without a wholesale adoption of one of the
Restatements presents a worthwhile but burdensome challenge.
342
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Kull, supra note 2, at 1195-96.

Id.; see also Laycock, supra note 2, at 1279 (A definition based on a common law writ “is little help to
modern lawyers. It is also misleading: restitution is both broader and narrower than the historic scope
of quasi-contract and constructive trust.”).
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Currently, there is no quick and easy solution that can be applied to simplify
this area of law. Being unfamiliar with restitution and unjust enrichment is the norm,
and in that sense it is not really a disadvantage. Still, a person unfamiliar with this
area of law is unlikely to recognize the availability of recovery in instances where
contract and tort are not available, but restitution based on unjust enrichment would
be available. 348 However, attorneys who familiarize themselves with this area of the
law will be able to take advantage of opportunities for recovery that most miss. 349
One way to do this is to conceptually recognize restitution and unjust enrichment as
its own area of law, where the real basis of the claim is the defendant‟s unjust
enrichment, and to accept the quasi contract as an illusion perpetuated for the sole
purpose of effectuating an equitable remedy at law; namely, restitution.350

348

See FISCHER, supra note 2, at 329-330.

Specifically, an understanding of restitution and unjust enrichment provides a distinct advantage
under the following circumstances:
349

1.

“[W]hen unjust enrichment is the only source of liability;

2.

[W]hen plaintiff prefers to measure recovery by defendant‟s gain, either because it exceeds
plaintiff‟s loss or because it is easier to measure; and”

3.

[W]hen plaintiff prefers specific restitution, either because the defendant is insolvent,
because the thing the plaintiff lost has changed in value, or because plaintiff values the thing
he lost for nonmarket reasons.”

Laycock, supra note 2, at 1284.
I am thankful that Attorney Chris Ralls exposed me to this area of law, and that Professor Carol
Mutter shared her knowledge with me, adding clarity and precision to this comment.
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